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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, Auditing & 
Financial Management at the International Hellenic University. 
Our study investigates the relation between ownership structures and earnings 
management using data from companies of the countries of the euro zone. Existing 
literature has documented that different kinds of ownership structures impact 
differently earnings management. Our dissertation includes founding family 
ownership, institutional ownership and managerial (insider) ownership as the 
ownership structures under investigation against earnings management. Following, we 
use for our study the modified – Jones model with Cash Flow from Operations, a model 
developed by Lacker & Richardson (2004). In order to detect real activities 
manipulation we employ measures as developed by Dechow et al. (1998), 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Kim et al. (2012). Our findings were consistent as the above 
mentioned theory commanded. 
We would like to give our sincerest thanks to our Supervisor Prof. Konstantinos Bozos 
and Co-Supervisor Alexandros Sikalidis for their guidance and advice throughout this 
demanding process. We owe great gratitude to Dr. Antonios Chantziaras, as well, for 
his timely and crucial support in our research. Lastly, we value our family’s and friends’ 
understanding as vital in completing our studies successfully. 
During our time as postgraduate students at International Hellenic University, we 
managed to evolve into career oriented individuals with a viable interpersonal skill set 
emphasizing frequently, but not exclusively, on the importance of organizing a well-
structured research governed by rationality. This particular programme has offered to 
us the opportunity to experience the challenge of IHU’s renowned educational 
standards, it has provided us with a solid overall foundation in international 
accounting, auditing and financial management and, ultimately, we are proud to be 
members of the proud alumni of IHU. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Accounting earnings is one of the most important indicators of firm’s financial 
performance. Consequently, there is a large volume of published studies regarding the 
earnings management phenomenon. Researchers try to identify relations and reasons 
for such behaviors. While some investigate the reasoning behind earnings 
management, others go even further and examine how ownership, corporate 
governance and independence affect earnings management. Earnings management 
occurs when insiders take certain decisions regarding financial reporting so as to 
manipulate figures and present a pleasant scene to outsiders. Ownership has a key 
role and a direct relation with earnings quality.  
Up to now, it is stated, by plenty of studies, that ownership structure could limit 
earnings manipulation by the managers (Bushman and Smith 2001) but also it could 
provide incentives to manage earnings in general (Warfield, Wild and Wild 1995). 
This study investigates the relations between different ownership structures and 
earnings management across Euro Zone countries. In our study we include the 
following types of ownership: founding family ownership, institutional ownership, 
managerial ownership so as to identify associations and interactions among different 
cases.  
We study earnings management using the approaches of 1) abnormal accruals and 2) 
real activities manipulation. 
Real activities manipulation, which has received little attention to date, is described as 
management actions that deviate from normal business practices, undertaken with the 
scope of meeting certain earnings targets depending on each case (Roychowdhury 
2006). Managers have incentives to manipulate real activities throughout the year to 
meet certain earnings thresholds. Real activities manipulation affects cash flows and in 
some cases, accruals too. We focus on real activities manipulation and for this reason 
we take into consideration the models developed by Roychowdhury (2006). 
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Roychowdhury (2006) first implemented the model that calculates the levels of cash 
flow from operations (CFO), a model developed by Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998). 
We also examine the production costs and the discretionary expenses, “variables that 
should capture the effect of real operations better than accruals” according to 
Roychowdhury (2006). 
Unlike real activities manipulation, which include management choices depicted on 
everyday activities, accrual-based earnings management has to do with alteration of 
accounting practices resulting in biased reported financial statements. For example, 
changing the depreciation method for fixed assets and the estimate for provision for 
doubtful accounts can bias reported earnings in a particular direction without changing 
the underlying transactions (Zang 2012). 
A great deal of studies on earnings management (Jones 1991, Wang 2005, Kothari et 
al. 2005) use discretionary accruals as surrogate for earnings quality. In this vein, we 
use in our study discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. 
Family ownership is a very important type of ownership that is common across 
European Union countries. Family businesses make up more than 60 % of all European 
companies, encompassing a vast range of firms of different sizes and from different 
sectors. Furthermore, “founding family ownership represent a unique class of 
shareholders that hold a poorly diversified portfolio, are long-term investors (multiple 
generations), and often control senior management positions” (Anderson and Reeb 
2003a, p. 1304). 
As stated by Wang (2006): “The relationship between family ownership and earnings 
management is an empirical issue”. Wang in his research provides us with two 
contradicting theories on the association between founding family ownership and 
earnings quality: the entrenchment effect on one hand and the alignment effect on the 
other hand.  
On one hand we identify cases where family members manipulate earnings, taking 
advantage of the concentration of power, at the cost of users of financial statements. 
These actions describe the entrenchment effect.  
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Founding family ownership is described as the case where family members own a 
substantial percentage of common shares of an entity or cases where founding family 
members serve as high level managers or directors in the board of the firms. The 
founding family ownership affects both demand and supply for quality financial 
statements. In certain cases, family members who serve as managers of directors 
affect the supply of quality earnings by intentionally reporting higher or lower 
accounting earnings depending on the stage at which their firms are. Family members 
have an incentive by doing manipulations either for tax purposes or personal interest 
or even both. In these cases we observe an ineffective monitoring of the actions of 
management by the board. Generally, concentration of ownership provides space for 
managers/owners to expropriate value. According to Fan and Wong (2002, p. 403), 
concentration of ownership limit the information flow to outside users of financial 
statements. Thus, the information asymmetry lowers the transparency of accounting 
earnings.  
From the other perspective, the outsiders who face the above described situation 
where reported earnings cannot be trusted and used efficiently, demand higher 
earnings quality from family firms or they impose stricter contracting terms. Thus, 
family firms have greater incentives to provide quality financial statements in 
exchange for better contracting terms, such as lower cost of capital (Wang 2006). 
On the other hand, there is the alignment effect where we observe actions by 
managers (family members) that decrease the information asymmetry between 
managers and outsiders and align both sides’ interests.  Family owned firms are firms 
created and managed through time by family members who own shares that pass from 
one generation to the next that share a family-company reputation. These firms share 
common values and beliefs that pass from generation to generation and accompany 
firms’ route. Consequently, managers that are family members have stronger 
incentives than non-family managers to report earnings of higher quality so as to 
achieve betters contracting terms with third parties that might help maintaining 
efficient operations and long-term firm performance. Conversely, in many cases when 
managers are non-family members have incentives to manipulate earnings so as to 
maximize their own personal ambitions and interests. 
  10 
Consistent with the alignment effect, family owned firms have more incentives to 
provide quality financial information than non-family firms. As stated by Wang (2006), 
while family members report high quality earnings the demand for quality earnings will 
decrease due to the fact that outsiders, such as banks or non-family shareholders, 
might rely less on quality statements to monitor managers taking into account the 
alignment of their interests with insiders. In this case, family firms have less incentive 
to report high-quality earnings. 
According to Dechow et al. (1996) there are certain corporate governance factors, 
including earnings management, which have an impact on corporate accounting 
behavior. Balsam et al. (2002) argue that institutional investors are more likely to 
detect systematic variations in observed firms’ performance than non-institutional 
investors, in the sense that they are sophisticated investors that have economies of 
scale in information gathering. Dechow et al. (1996) state that large blockholders could 
improve a company’s financial statement credibility since they provide a detailed 
examination over the firm’s earnings management activity. Furthermore, Warfield et 
al. (1995) find that managers who own a significant portion of equity stakes of a 
company have less incentive to manage reported earnings. All the above mentioned 
studies indicate that a company’s ownership structure has imminent association on 
earnings management. 
Our research contributes to the literature on earnings management by indicating 
evidence on real activities manipulation made by managers of firms across European 
Union countries. To our knowledge, there is no study available that examines this 
phenomenon using data for entities from several EU states. More specifically, our final 
sample existed of 641 listed companies with headquarters in 11 different countries in 
European Union region and we examined their accounts over a 5-year period, from 
2012 through 2016.We find evidence that family ownership is positively associated 
with earnings manipulation and that institutional ownership is associated with lower 
earnings management.Therefore, our study fully supports the related literature. 
The results of our research have important implications to the investing community. If 
ownership structure affects managers’ decisions (earnings management), our evidence 
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can be useful to investors in defining accurate versus inaccurate financial information. 
Furthermore, the findings will be of great value for regulators and standard-setters so 
as to better understand the interactions between alternative ownership structures and 
earnings management through real activities manipulation. Finally, all users of financial 
statements may find this study useful since it analyses a subject of financial reporting 
and as a result it will be useful in making economic decisions.  
Next chapter includes the literature review and the hypothesis development. In the 
third section we describe our research design. Moreover, the sample selection is 
described in the fourth chapter. Findings of our study are displayed in the fifth chapter. 
Last but not least, the sixth section of this study includes our recommendations and 
the conclusion. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This section is devoted on the literature that was the stepping stone of our research. 
For starters, we present an analysis of family firms. What are the challenges family 
firms face nowadays? How family firms are governed? Next, we go on with the related 
literature on earnings quality and alternative ownership structures and we examine 
the link between them. How ownership is associated with earnings management? 
Taking table 1 as our point of departure, we now go on and form our hypotheses on 
the association between earnings quality and ownership structures. 
Table 1: Expected Signs 
 
2.1 Characterizing Family Firms 
Family owned firms have a crucial role not only because they make an essential 
contribution to the economy, but also due to the long-term stability they bring in the 
economy, the specific commitment they show to local communities, the responsibility 
they feel as owners and the values they stand for. Taking into consideration all the 
Ins Percentage of total common equity owned by managers -
Fam Percentage of total common equity by founding family members +
Instit
Percentage of total common equity owned by institutional investors -
lnSIZE Natural logarithm of market value of equity +
Big4 dummy variable ?
LnAge Natural logarithm of firm age in years ?
ROA Net income to total assets ?
Lev Ratio of long-term debt to assets +
EqOffer dummy variable ?
Loss dummy variable +
Growth Growth rate in sales +
Intercept Intercept ?
Names Indicators
Expected relation to earnings 
management
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above mentioned precious factors, we conclude that their role is very important for 
the backdrop of the current financially distressed period. (European Commission) 
As stated before, founding family firms make up for more than 60% of all European 
companies, representing approximately 50% of all jobs across EU. It should also be 
mentioned that most family businesses are SMEs (especially micro and small 
companies).  
There is a huge debated on the definition of what should be the key to point a family 
business. Related literature shows that there is not a single definition of family 
business. After analyzing family, business and ownership, European Commission came 
up with the following definition for family firms:  
“A firm, of any size, is a family business, if: 
1) The majority of decision-making rights is in the possession of the natural person(s) 
who established the firm, or in the possession of the natural person(s) who has/have 
acquired the share capital of the firm, or in the possession of their spouses, parents, 
child or children’s direct heirs. 
2) The majority of decision-making rights are indirect or direct. 
3) At least one representative of the family or kin is formally involved in the 
governance of the firm. 
4) Listed companies meet the definition of family enterprise if the person who 
established or acquired the firm (share capital) or their families or descendants 
possess 25 per cent of the decision-making rights mandated by their share capital.” 
Ownership is fundamental to the business cycle of the firm. Either we are analyzing a 
family or a non – family owned company, it is important to understand the association 
between ownership and governance. Bearing in mind the above we can make a clear 
distinction between family and non – family businesses. 
The greatest differentiation between family and non – family controlled enterprises 
lies in the ability of the management of family business to direct their operations 
through founding values. Successful family firms are those you share their goals and 
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visions through the family members to the staff performing everyday activities. Ronald 
S. Burt (1999) showed that the stronger a firm’s culture, the higher the return of its 
investments. 
Astrachan, Klein and Smyrnios have pointed out, “a definition of family is often 
missing” and “this notable absence poses problems, particularly in an international 
context where families and cultures differ not only across geographical boundaries, but 
also over time.” (Astrachan; Klein; Smyrnios; 2006) 
The difference between the evolution of any firm and a family firm lies in the quality of 
the procedures screening the strategic initiatives. Family businesses, because of their 
seniority, compromise with the legacy of their past culture and know – how coming 
from material and immaterial investments. Consequently, one may think that the 
apathy of these firms will lead them to make choices in the continuity of attitudes 
securing permanence and, consequently, not to select rash initiatives. 
A family business apparently bears natural variables enabling it to resist crises. As they 
are boosted by values established in their family environment, their main objective is 
permanence through times. The pursuit of financial independence makes it less 
vulnerable to a reduction of liquid assets on financial markets. Furthermore family 
firms have a longer time decision horizon which does not systematically boost a rapid 
return on investment, while preserving short-time realness of adaptation to its 
environment. 
The institutional framework and policy initiatives regarding family businesses differ 
from country to country. Measures favoring family businesses are (or have been) 
implemented by different actors and tackle a range of problems such as taxation, 
company law, planning the business transfer, research and dissemination of 
information, promotion of entrepreneurship and family governance. Exchanging the 
“good practices” identified has great potential for the development of the sector 
across Europe. European Commission should take an active role in this direction, raise 
awareness of the importance of the sector, and advice national governments to 
implement such practices so as to create a favorable environment for family 
enterprises especially on areas of taxation and company law. Furthermore, European 
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Commission should also promote the establishment of a contact point in a national or 
European ground for family firms in order to connect them and help them exchange 
crucial information for their existence in time. 
2.2 Challenges faced by Family Firms 
There are a lot of challenges that family firms deal nowadays. Many of them also 
concern other small or medium sized companies in general. However, some are 
common to any type of business, some affect family firms more specifically, and others 
are exclusive to them. Generally speaking, challenges can either stem from the 
environment in which companies operate; or are related to the family firm’s internal 
matters while there are also other issues regarding education and research impact on 
both the environment and internal matters. 
According to European Commission, we present a list of the challenges faced by family 
controlled firms across European Union: 
1. Challenges that arise from the environment in which companies 
operate: 
 Unawareness of policy makers of the specificities of family businesses, 
and their economic and social contribution; 
 Financial issues (e.g. gift and inheritance tax, access to finance without 
losing control of the firm, favorable tax treatment of reinvested profits). 
2. Challenges that develop as a consequence of the family firm’s internal 
matters: 
 Unawareness by family firms of the importance of planning business 
transfers early; 
 Balance between the family, ownership and business aspects within the 
enterprise; 
 Difficulties in attracting and retaining a skilled workforce. 
3. Challenges related to educational and research aspects, which have an 
impact on both the business environment and on family firms’ internal 
matters: 
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 Lack of entrepreneurship education and family – business – specific 
management training and research into family – business – specific topics. 
2.3 Preparing business transfers early 
Succession is seen by many researchers as the most important issue that family 
businesses have to cope with. It is also widely agreed that intergenerational transfer is 
not a single event, but a process that needs to be planned in advance in order to 
succeed (Mazzola et al. 2006).  
The diversity of family businesses also affects intergenerational transfers. The issue 
differs according to size of the company, the size of the family and/or age of the 
company. The problem is not the same for a large company managed by a five – 
member family and a small company with only one owner. 
Transfer of ownership in family controlled firms is a controversial issue. Ownership has 
a special meaning in family firms. It involves a strong “personal” feature. Family 
owners don’t think they own simply capital. They feel that they have concerns and 
responsibilities to the society. In this direction, owning a stake in a family business is 
not seen as a liquid asset but as a property which is built and developed by the family 
over generations. When a business is transferred within the family (from one 
generation to another), the financial capital is transferred with a “social and cultural 
capital” that usually leads to an enhanced personal commitment to the company and 
to the community.  
The whole process of transferring the business is even more important for family 
companies because, alongside the transfer of ownership, the knowledge accumulated 
from generation to generation is at stake. Both the person leaving the business and 
the entrepreneur taking over should be involved. In family firms, emotional aspects 
attached to the transfer need to be carefully managed since the leaver may continue 
to influence the business even after the transfer has taken place. 
The main issue to tackle to successfully complete the transfer is to raise awareness of 
the importance of early preparation, and to make available tools for the transfer (e.g. 
specialized training for the parties involved). This type of initiative is best undertaken 
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at local level, or by private-sector organizations. Some countries already implement 
innovative and effective measures.  
2.4 Family Governance 
Entrepreneurship is hugely relevant to family businesses. Most start – ups begin as a 
family business and are faced with the question as to whether they want to continue 
the business beyond the founders. Therefore, promoting entrepreneurship is directly 
linked to promoting family businesses. 
As most start – ups begin as a family business, education should also include specific 
family business issues such as ownership, succession and family governance to better 
prepare future entrepreneurs to successfully run their businesses. Entrepreneurship 
education should aim to foster new family entrepreneurs, but also to promote 
entrepreneurial behavior and innovation in existing family firms.  
One of the main features of the family business is the part that represents the 
“family’s capital”. Family firms in most cases act like a non – diversified shareholder 
that take on risk – averse investments so as not to endanger this “family’s capital”. This 
becomes an asset in times of crisis. 
A family business shows that fundamental characteristic which in the interaction 
between the life of the business and the lives of one or more families, the family 
depends on firm and firm on family. Consequently, it is governed by a compromise of 
the values, standards and objectives of two systems, the former that works with an 
emotional logic (family) and the latter with a rational logic (firm). 
Although, family firms have no specific structure, they share certain features directly 
derived from their culture and history. The active role of the board of directors is one 
of the most important factors of existence in family business. However, most family 
controlled firms underestimate the board’s crucial role, by appointing only family 
members in the board and just ratify decisions which have already been made. 
Divergences between family members may cause conflicts, and may even endanger 
the existence of the company. This is a common phenomenon. However, coexistence 
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of family members in family companies usually contributes to the success through 
stable situations. Companies with no different opinions and conflicts sometimes miss 
their ability to innovate, adapt and change. 
2.5 Related Literature on Ownership and Earnings Management 
Since agency theory is applied, ownership and management, as Jensen and Meckling 
suggests (1976), are two different concepts. According to the classic approach, these 
two parties are the driving forces behind corporate function and well-being. An 
important monitoring mechanism (Dechow et al., 1996), corporate ownership 
structure, frequently is being manipulated in order to benefit the conductor (Healy 
1985; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Guidry et al. 1999). 
2.5.1 Earnings Management 
Consistent with the literature, we examine earnings quality using discretionary 
accruals. However, managers may use both accrual - based accounting estimates and 
real activity methods to manipulate reported earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 1999, 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995, Dechow and Skinner 2000, Zang 2006). 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), ‘‘Earnings management occurs when managers 
use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting practices.’’ Sales manipulation, Reduction of discretionary 
expenditures and Overproduction are some real activity manipulation methods 
available to managers (Healy and Wahlen 1999, Fudenberg and Tirole 1995, Dechow 
and Skinner 2000, Roychowdhury 2006). 
Graham et al. (2005) in their research report that they found evidence that managers 
use real activity manipulations extensively, more specifically they reported that 80% of 
the survey participants admitted that they would decrease discretionary spending on 
R&D, advertising, and maintenance to meet an earnings target. Additionally, above 
55.3% stated that they would delay starting a new project to meet an earnings target. 
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According to Zang (2012) companies choose between the two techniques of earnings 
management based on relative costs. More specifically, the method that bears the 
lowest cost is the one used by managers. 
According to Roychowdhury (2006) “real activities manipulation is defined as 
departures from normal operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire to 
mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have 
been met in the normal course of operations”. These actions do not necessarily lead to 
value creation. 
Managers often use the aforementioned real activity manipulation techniques due to 
their belief that through meeting certain earning targets they will succeed private 
benefits. They could also be engaged when companies face a financial distress so as to 
avoid debt covenant violation or governmental fines. 
Accrual-based earnings management is achieved by changing the accounting methods 
or estimates used when presenting a given transaction in the financial statements. For 
example, changing the depreciation method for fixed assets and the estimate for 
provision for doubtful accounts can bias reported earnings in a particular direction 
without changing the underlying transactions. 
According to the related literature (Roychowdhury 2006), real activity manipulation 
means greater long – term costs on the company. However, managers tend to use real 
activities management due to the lower private costs they bear in contrast with the 
accrual manipulation (Roychowdhury 2006). Among other reasons, accrual 
manipulation is more likely to draw auditors’ and tax authorities’ attention than 
decisions about production and pricing. Another reason why real activities 
management is extensively used by executives might be due to the fact that accrual 
management if used alone bears the risk of falling below the earnings threshold by the 
end of the year when decisions on real activities are no longer available 
(Roychowdhury 2006). 
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2.5.2 Ownership Structures 
Researchers have stated that insider ownership is highly correlated with higher levels 
of earnings management when it comes to their personal interest (Ali et al. 2008; 
Ebrahim 2007; Klein 2002; Warfield et al. 1995; Banderlipe 2009). Specifically, 
managers manipulate earnings in order to succeed maximization of their personal 
fortune (Healy 1985; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Guidry et al. 1999).  
Studies revealed that controlling families present opportunistic behavior for their 
personal ambitions that may lead to inferior quality of reporting (Gul et al. 2003;                                
Chung et al. 2004). Moreover, as Claessensnad fan (2002) indicates that family owners 
cooperate more efficiently with minority shareholders and creditors producing high 
quality financial reporting (Anderson et al., 2003). 
Institutional ownership has a very important part in monitoring management (Almazan 
et al., 2005). There is a positive connection between institutional ownership and 
monitoring management by decreasing agency costs and lessens the ability of 
managers for manipulation (Chung et al., 2002). Bushee (1998) argues that by based 
on the fact that managers are mainly focused on short-term financial results. 
Therefore it is not possible for institutional owners to monitor management. To all of 
the above Charitou et al. (2007) and Agnes Cheng and Reitenga (2009) found that 
institutional owners might be not able to vote against managers when they have to 
supervise them, because this may lead to manipulation in a roundabout way. 
The work of Aharony, Lee and Wond (2000) provides information of privately owned 
companies, compared to public owned; manipulate earnings management to a 
diminished level. Justifying the popular belief that public owned companies exercise 
more earnings management even in cases of different capital markets or aberrant 
situations (Ding et al., 2007; Aharony et al., 2000). 
Worth noticing that all of the above should be taken into account having in mind that 
the essence of corporate governance, at its core, is to preserve accountability 
(Bushman, RM and Smith, AJ, 2003). 
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Analyzing the above mentioned information and regarding the ownership structure as 
an important monitoring technique we believe 3 types of ownership structure should 
be examined: 
i. Managerial 
ii. Founding Family 
iii. Institutional  
2.5.3 Managerial Ownership and Earnings Management 
Based on Agency theory, it is known that managers’ interests are in accordance with 
shareholders’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Findings revealed that managerial 
opportunistic behavior declines while managerial ownership is rising. That affects 
firm’s performance in a positive way for the reason that earnings management 
decreases. 
As Indicated by Warfield et al. (1995), Klein (2002) and Ebrahim (2007) insider or 
managerial ownership is correlated with lower level of earnings management. 
Therefore, that kind of ownership structure may be also perceived as a preventing 
mechanism to reduce opportunistic behaviors by insiders and consequently earnings 
management manipulation. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggests that insider ownership, by holding high percentages 
of shareholding, could lead to a path that managers are pursuing to fulfill only personal 
interests due to lack of fear of penalties. 
It is acknowledged that insiders’ gaining ability is linked with earnings management 
(Yang, Lai and Tan, 2008). When stock prices are manipulated to stay high, their share 
value follows at the same direction. Regularly the vehicle of succeeding that is by using 
discretionary accruals to improve stock value through earnings. 
Frequently, shareholders’ interests and managerial ones coincide. Morck et al. (1988) 
proves the above mentioned by showing the affiliation between the levels of insiders’ 
ownership and the connection of interests between them. In other words, based on 
the shareholders’ necessity for high quality and effective monitoring mechanisms we 
conclude to our first hypothesis that: 
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H1: Managerial ownership is associated with lower earnings management. 
2.5.4 Founding Family Ownership and earnings management 
Across euro zone, family controlled companies constitute a great percentage. Family 
members having strong presence in firms’ boards of directors or hold other key 
positions are the cause of the second type of agency problem (Claessens and Fan, 
2002). All these abate sufficient monitoring and increase the possibility of earnings 
management. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) perhaps imply that controlling families are using 
entrenchment effect to expropriate minority shareholders for pushing their own 
personal interest agenda. 
Based on the asymmetry of information, caused by the above – mentioned effect, 
controlling families gather all the characteristics for conducting earnings management, 
such as motive and opportunity. Chung et al. (2004) provides the information that 
family controlled firms led by family ambitions, which are diminishing financial 
reporting quality.  
Evidence by Bertrand et al. (2002) indicates that controlling family members are 
expropriating even more earnings management for their own personal or family gain. 
As it is expected, when firms are entirely controlled by families the possibility of 
earnings management is significantly higher (Fan and Wong, 2002). 
Inevitably we are obliged to assume that: 
H2: Family ownership is associated with higher earnings management. 
2.5.5 Institutional Ownership and earnings management 
Institutional ownership, as a monitoring mechanism, could be an important tool in 
control of earnings management. As agency theory and specifically the efficient 
monitoring hypothesis suggests, monitoring management, except from a crucial 
business process, is inextricably linked to the type of ownership in general. That is the 
case with institutional ownership (Almazan et al., 2005). 
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Considering the findings of Chung et al. (2002), institutional ownership is correlated 
favorably with the results of monitoring management, especially when it comes to the 
ability of managers to manipulate earnings management (Chung et al., 2002). 
This kind of relationship is proposed by many researchers in the past.  Koh (2003), 
Bushee (1998) and Ebrahim (2007) are some of them. 
Thus, we conclude to our hypothesis: 
H3: Institutional ownership is associated with lower earnings management. 
2.6 On the association between Accrual Accounting and Cash Flows 
In our research we use the modified – Jones model with Cash Flow from Operations, as 
developed by Lacker and Richardson (2004).The modified Jones model involves 
regressing total accruals on the difference between the change in revenues and the 
change in receivables as well as the level of gross property plant and equipment. 
Additionally, Lacker and Richardson added the CFO in the Jones model so as to reduce 
the measurement error. 
According to related literature (Dechow, Kothari, and Watts 1998), one of the central 
roles of accrual accounting is to smooth out temporary fluctuations in cash flows, as 
accrual accounting systems recognize economic events in firms’ financial statements 
independently of the timing of cash flows associated with these events. Dechow (1994) 
observed and reported a negative relation between accrual accounting and cash flows. 
Although, recent study by Bushman, Lerman and Zhang (2016) pointed out that the 
correlation between accruals and cash flows has dramatically dropped over the past 
half century and has largely disappeared in more recent years. More specifically, in 
their research they used two models to examine the relation between accruals and 
cash flows, the first model is the one developed by Dechow (1994) that is used to 
regress total accruals on contemporaneous operating cash flows for each year from 
1964 through 2014. They examined the changes on the goodness of fit measure and in 
coefficient on cash flows. They reported that the adjusted R2 dropped from 90% that 
was in 1960s to lower than 20% in more recent years. A drop of more than 70%. 
Furthermore, they found that the overall correlation between accruals and cash flows 
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has significantly diminished over the past 50 years. Moreover, the second model that 
Bushman, Lerman and Zhang (2016) used is the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model for 
regressing total accruals on past, current, and future operating cash flows. Similarly, 
they conclude that the R2 of the model has dramatically declined from 70% in the 
1960s to below 10% in recent years. The coefficient on contemporaneous cash flows 
has increased from about −0.8 to −0.4 over the same time period. However, they find 
that the coefficients on past and future cash flows show only a small positive change 
over time. 
Bushman’s et al. (2016) findings on the overall correlation between accruals and cash 
flows have broad implications for the academic and research community. Given that 
the generally accepted accounting rules remained unchanged till today, there might be 
other economic and reporting alterations and developments that lead to this extreme 
decline. “The growing prominence of firms with high intangible intensity could lead to 
an increase in transactions that do not generate accruals due to immediate expensing 
of cash outflows” according to Bushman et al. (2016) might be one of them. Another 
instance could be the extensive use of fair value accounting that may have influenced 
the relation between cash flow and accruals. Additionally, the frequency of reporting 
non – operating items and net losses may also attenuate the pronounced correlation. 
“Overall, even though the conceptual timing role of accrual accounting has not been 
changed, a significant increase in the magnitude of other elements of accruals may 
lead to a decline in the extent of the observed negative correlation between accruals 
and operating cash flows” (Bushman, Lerman and Zhang 2016). 
The findings of Bushman et al. (2016) suggest that the popular accrual models used 
extensively in literature lack explanatory power nowadays and thus the results of 
discretionary accruals estimated might be reexamined for consistency. In case cash 
flows explain little of the variation in total accruals, then the residual value from the 
model, discretionary accruals, is basically accruals and the variance of the discretionary 
accruals is typically the variance of accruals, something that has no usefulness in our 
effort to assess accounting quality (Bushman, Lerman and Zhang 2016). 
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Taking into consideration all the aforementioned, we use the modified – Jones model 
although we are noncommittal for the findings since according to Bushman, Lerman 
and Zhang (2016) there is a huge decline in magnitude on the relation between 
accruals (dependent variable) and cash flows (independent variable), meaning that the 
modified – Jones model, used in our study to estimate discretionary accruals that area 
proxy for earnings management, may not explain and predict outcomes. 
 
 
  
  26 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Measures of Earnings Quality 
Following the accounting literature, we estimate earnings management using two 
proxies: 1) Discretionary Accruals and 2) Real Activities Manipulation.  
3.1.1 Abnormal Accrual Analysis 
The accrual component of earnings contains accounting estimates based on forecasts 
and is therefore easier to manipulate than case flow (Lacker and Richardson 2004). 
Hence, accruals seem to be a very useful measure for detecting opportunistic 
behaviors within a firm. 
Lacker & Richardson (2004) modified Jones (1991) model in an attempt to identify the 
unexpected component of total accruals. Attempts to decompose total accruals into 
expected and unexpected components can always be criticized for misclassifying 
expected accruals as unexpected due to the fact that the model of expected accruals is 
incomplete. (Lacker & Richardson 2004) 
So as to overcome the above described issue Lacker & Richardson (2004) used a more 
advanced model. Their model is similar to the one employed by Dechow, Richardson 
and Tuna (2003). Dechow’s et al. (2003) model suggests that this model has greater 
explanatory power than the modified Jones (1991) model. However, the attempt to 
decompose total accruals has still limitations. 
Lacker’s and Richardson’s (2004) model assumes that change in revenues less the 
change in accounts receivables is free from managerial discretion (credit sales are 
assumed to be abnormal) and that capital intensity drives normal accruals (Lacker & 
Richardson 2004). Their model also incorporates the current operating cash flows 
(CFO) as a measure of current operating performance so as to reduce the 
measurement error. 
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3.1.2 Real Activities Manipulation 
According to Roychowdhury (2006) “real activities manipulation is defined as 
departures from normal operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire to 
mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have 
been met in the normal course of operations”. These actions do not necessarily lead to 
value creation. 
Manipulation of operational activities may lead to paths of uncertainty due to the fact 
that certain actions taken in the current period affect cash flows in the future periods. 
For instance, extreme price discounts during one period so as to increase sales volume, 
may lead to lower cash inflow over the life of the sales. Another example is the case of 
overproduction when firms produce abundant amounts of goods and this can have an 
adverse effect on inventory holding costs for the company. 
Personal ambitions and benefits are the driving force for managers to take part in such 
activities, while others engage in manipulation activities because they are acting as 
agents in value-transfers amongst stakeholders (Roychowdhury 2006).“An example of 
the latter would be earnings management to avoid debt covenant violation or to avoid 
governmental intervention” (Roychowdhury 2006). 
For the purpose of our research we use the model of Roychowdhury (2006) as 
originally developed by Dechow et al. (1998) that calculates the normal levels of CFO, 
discretionary expenses and productions costs for every firm-year. Deviations from the 
normal levels are signed as abnormal CFO, abnormal production costs, and abnormal 
discretionary expenses.  Additionally, we calculate COMB_RAM as AB_CFO-AB_PROD+ 
AB_DIS based on Kim’s et al. (2012) study in an attempt to examine how overall 
operational manipulations affect earnings management. The combined real activities 
manipulation proxy decreases as firms engage in more operational manipulations. 
Consequently, we focus on the following manipulation methods:  
1. Sales manipulation. 
2. Reduction of discretionary expenditures. 
3. Overproduction. 
4. Combined real activities manipulation. 
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3.2 Experimental Variables 
Following Wang’s (2006) approach we measure founding family ownership based on 
the percentage of common stock owned by family members (Fam).The greater the 
percentage owned by family members (Fam) the greater the family interest in the firm. 
So as to measure managerial ownership and its association with abnormal activities 
inside firms, we use another variable (Ins) that is calculated by summing the 
percentage owned by insiders, including executives and directors. 
Furthermore, in order to calculate institutional ownership we form a variable (Instit) 
that includes the percentage owned by institutional investors, which are large 
investors other than individuals. The percentages owned by institutional investors are 
simply the sum of the percentage of the following organization: 
 Insurance companies (life and non-life) 
 Mutual and Pension Funds 
 Financial Institutions 
 Banks 
 Investment companies 
 Nominees 
 Trustees 
 Hedge Funds 
 Foundations and Research Institutes 
 Venture Capitals 
3.3 Control Variables 
As mentioned earlier in our study, managers may likely use both methods of 
manipulation (real activities and accrual – based) to manage their reported earnings. 
Alternatively, according to Zang (2012) companies choose between the two 
aforementioned techniques based on relative costs. More specifically, the method that 
bears the lowest cost is the one used by managers. In order to control for the 
substitute nature of the earnings manipulation techniques, as in Cohen et al. (2008), 
we include COMB_RAM, a real activities manipulation proxy, as a control variable in 
the discretionary accruals equation (8) and JDA, a proxy for accrual – based earnings 
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management, as a control variable in the real activities manipulation regression 
(equation 9). 
We introduce several other control variables so as to isolate other contradicting 
incentives that could influence the accounting choices of managers. Thus, we include 
the size of the firm (natural logarithm of Market Value of Equity) and the firm’s growth 
opportunity (growth rate in sales), variables that can potentially explain variations in 
earnings management (Roychowdhury2006). Specifically, prior studies 
(Roychowdhury2006) have estimated that rapidly growing companies are expected to 
maintain a greater level of earnings management. In order to control for the leverage 
and equity – offering related incentives for earnings manipulation, we include leverage 
and an indicator for the incidence of an equity offering during the following fiscal year 
(Kim et al. 2012).Leverage ratio, calculated as long-term debt to lagged total assets, is 
included in our regression as a proxy for a company’s proximity to the violation of the 
contractual debt restraints since managers are more likely to manipulate accounting 
earnings when they are closer to default such debt restraints. In the regressions we 
also use the dummy variable Loss, that takes the value of 1 if net income is negative 
and zero otherwise, so as to examine the assumption that firms facing financial 
difficulties are extensively engaged in financial statements manipulation. 
Moreover, to the extent earnings management might differ for firms audited by large 
audit firms we include an indicator variable, Big4that takes the value of 1 for 
companies using a Big4 auditing firm and zero otherwise. It is stated that Big4 auditors 
are more likely to detect material misstatements in firm’s financial statements. We 
also include ROA in our regressions, to isolate the effect of ownership structures on 
earnings management after controlling for the potential effect of financial 
performance. 
Lastly, we include firm age (natural logarithm of firm age in years) as Wang (2006) as a 
control variable in our model due to the fact that older firms are less likely to be 
founding family owned (Anderson and Reeb 2003a). 
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3.4 Models 
3.4.1 Abnormal Accrual Analysis 
There are plenty of studies that use either the Jones (1991) model or a modified – 
Jones model developed by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995). For our study we will 
use the modified – Jones model with Cash Flow from Operations, a model developed 
by Lacker & Richardson (2004). The modified Jones model involves regressing total 
accruals on the difference between the change in revenues and the change in 
receivables (the difference between the change in revenues and the change in 
receivables is used in order to adjust the change in revenues for the change in 
receivables) as well as the level of gross property plant and equipment. Additionally, 
Lacker and Richardson added the CFO in the Jones model so as to reduce the 
measurement error. All model variables, including the intercept, are divided by lagged 
total assets so as to avoid heteroskedasticity problems. For each year we estimate the 
model for every industry classified by its 4-digit NACE code. Thus, our approach 
partially controls for industry-wide changes in economic conditions that affect total 
accruals while allowing the coefficients to vary across time (Kasznik, 1999; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994). 
 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 (
1
𝛵𝛢𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝑎2 (
𝐷_𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−𝐷_𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
) + 𝑎3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
) + 𝑎4
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
Where, 
TACCit= total accruals, measured as net income before extraordinary items minus 
operating cash flows. 
TAit-1 = lagged total assets. 
D_REVit= change in revenues from year t-1 to year t. 
D_RECit= change in accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t. 
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PPEit = property, plant and equipment. 
CFOit = cash flow from operations. 
i,t = firm and time subscripts. 
εit = residual term 
The residual value (εit) from this model is the Discretionary Accruals value, JDAit, the 
estimate of unexpected or abnormal accruals from our extended Jones model. The 
higher the level of discretionary accruals, the greater the level of earnings 
management. 
3.4.2 Real Activities Manipulation 
To detect real activities manipulation we employ the following four measures as 
developed by Dechow et al. (1998), Roychowdhury (2006) and Kim et al. (2012).As in 
Roychowdhury’s research (2006) we consider the abnormal levels of cash flow from 
operations (CFO), discretionary expenses and production costs to study the level of 
real activities manipulations. We also take into account the combined real activities 
manipulation proxy as in Kim et al. (2012) to examine the overall operational 
manipulations. 
3.4.2.1 Abnormal levels of CFO (AB_CFO) 
Roychowdhury (2006) calculated normal levels of cash flow from operations using the 
following model:  
 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 (
1
𝛵𝛢𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽21 (
𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝛥𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (2) 
 
 
Where,  
CFOit = operating cash flows in year t.  
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TAit-1 = lagged total assets.  
Sit = net sales in year t.  
ΔSit = difference between net sales and lagged net sales (Sit – Sit-1).  
For each year-firm, abnormal operating cash flows (AB_CFO) are simply the residual 
(εit) from above described the equation (2). 
3.4.2.2 Abnormal Production Costs (AB_PROD) 
Production costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold (COGS) and change in 
inventory during the year. 
In order to estimate the normal production costs there is the need to calculate the 
normal cost of goods sold and afterwards the normal inventory growth. 
Expenses are expressed as a linear function of contemporaneous sales. The model for 
normal cost of goods sold (COGS) according to Roychowdhury (2006): 
 
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 (
1
𝛵𝛢𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽 (
𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (3) 
 
Where,  
COGSt = cost of goods sold in year t.  
TAt-1; St = as defined previously. 
 
To estimate the normal inventory growth (ΔINV) we use the following model: 
 
 
𝛥𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 (
1
𝛵𝛢𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
𝛥𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝛥𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (4) 
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Where,  
ΔINVt = change in inventory in year t.  
ΔSt-1 = lagged change in net sales.  
TAt-1; ΔSt= as defined previously. 
 
Consistent with Cohen et al. (2008), Roychowdhury (2006), Kim et al. (2012) and Zang 
(2012), production costs are defined as PRODit = COGSit + ΔINVit. Consequently by using 
functions (3) and (4), Roychowdhury (2006) estimate normal production costs from the 
following industry-year regression: 
 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 (
1
𝛵𝛢𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝛥𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝛥𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (5) 
 
The residual term (εit) from the model above (5), constitutes the abnormal 
production cost (AB_PROD). 
3.4.2.3 Abnormal Discretionary Expenses (AB_DIS) 
The abnormal discretionary expenses (AB_DIS) are the third measure of real activities 
manipulation. Consistent with Roychowdhury (2006) discretionary expenses should be 
also expressed as a linear function of contemporaneous sales, similar to COGS. 
Modeling discretionary expenses as a function of current sales creates a problem, if 
firms manage sales upwards to increase reported earnings in a certain year, resulting 
in significantly lower residuals from running a regression using current sales volume 
(Cohen 2008). To address this issue, discretionary expenses are calculated as a 
function of lagged sales. The regression model used to estimate the normal 
discretionary expenses then would be:  
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𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 (
1
𝛵𝛢𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽 (
𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (6) 
 
 
Where,  
DISEXPt = discretionary expenses in year t, are calculated as the sum of 
Advertising, Research & Development, and Selling General and Administrative 
Expenses.  
TAt-1; St-1 = as defined previously.  
For each year-firm, we measure abnormal discretionary expenditure (AB_DIS) by 
estimating the residual (εit) from model (6). 
 
 
3.4.2.4 Combined Measure of Real Activities Manipulation (COMB_RAM) 
Finally, we calculate a combined measure of real activities manipulation COMB_RAM 
that is estimated as AB_CFO - AB_PROD + AB_DIS based on Kim’s et al. (2012) study in 
an attempt to examine how overall operational manipulations affect earnings 
management. 
 
 
 
COMB_RAM = AB_CFO – AB_PROD + AB_DIS  (7) 
 
3.5 Empirical models 
There are many factors affecting earnings managements. To capture the association 
between earnings management and ownership structure which is the center of our 
attention, we estimate the following models.  
Our first model examines the relation between discretionary accruals and ownership 
structures. Additionally, we will use several control variables such as Firm Size, Firm 
Age, Return on Assets (ROA), Leverage so as to evaluate their relation with earnings 
management. 
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JDA𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐵_𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑖𝑡) +
𝛽5(𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽7(𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽8(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽9(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽10(𝐸𝑞𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡) +
𝛽11(𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽12(𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (8) 
 
Where, 
JDAit= value of discretionary accruals. 
Insit= percentage of total common equity owned by managers. 
Famit= percentage of total common equity owned by founding family members. 
Institit= percentage of total common equity owned by institutional investors. 
COMB_RAMit = AB_CFO, AB_PROD, AB_EXP or RAM_PROXY: 
 AB_CFO = the level of abnormal cash flows from operations. 
 AB_PROD = the level of abnormal production costs, where production costs are 
defined as the sum of cost of goods sold and the change in inventories. 
 AB_DIS = the level of abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary 
expenses are the sum of R&D expenses, advertising expenses and SG&A 
expenses. 
 COMB_RAM = AB_CFO - AB_PROD + AB_EXP 
Big4it = dummy variable: 1 if the auditor is one of the big 4 auditing 
companies and 0 otherwise. 
Sizeit = natural logarithm of market value of equity. 
Ageit = natural logarithm of firm age in years. 
ROAit= net income to total assets. 
Levit= ratio of long-term debt to lagged total assets. 
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EqOfferit = an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has equity 
offerings in the following year or zero otherwise. 
Lossit = dummy variable: 1 if net income is negative and 0 otherwise. 
Growthit= growth rate in sales. 
εit = residual term. 
β0 = constant term. 
β1 to β12 = coefficients. 
Now, to explore how earnings quality is related to real activities manipulation we rely 
on the model developed by Kim et al. (2012): 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐵_𝑅𝐴𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4(JDA𝑖𝑡) +
𝛽5(𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽7(𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽8(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽9(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽10(𝐸𝑞𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡) +
𝛽11(𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽12(𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (9) 
 
Where, 
All variables are defined as previously. 
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4. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
In the beginning of this section, we explain in detail our data selection criteria.  
4.1 Data and Sample selection 
We collect our sample using Amadeus database for the five – year period 2012 – 2016. 
We restrict our sample to all non – financial Euro zone active firms with available data 
and require at least 2 observations in each 4 – digit NACE grouping per year. Moreover, 
we require that each firm – year observation has all available data to estimate the 
discretionary accruals (JDA, model 1) and real activity earnings management proxies 
(models 2 to 7) that we used in our research. By following the aforementioned 
research strategy, we may introduce bias in our sample since we include only larger 
and more successful firms. Consequently, we expect that the variation in our earnings 
quality proxies will decline leading our research to more conservative paths. 
For starters, we focus our attention in Europe and more specifically we choose to 
examine countries within the Euro area. The euro area is a monetary union of 19 of the 
28 European Union (EU) member states which has adopted euro as their common 
currency and sole length tender(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone). After 
applying multiple criteria, we finally include 641 listed companies in our testing sample 
from 11 Euro area countries: Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta and Netherland. The rationale behind our choice 
to focus on Euro area countries was mainly due to the special and unique 
characteristics of euro zone economies. It is very interesting to examine the Euro area 
case due to the fact that countries within euro zone act together but in different pace 
and intensity. Additionally, euro zone is a special case regarding our study on the 
association between earnings management and founding family ownership, because 
Euro area countries “host” mainly family owned companies. According to 
contemporary evidence from European Commission, family business sector accounts 
for more than 60% of all European companies, representing between 40% - 50% of all 
jobs (https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/promoting-entrepreneurship/we-work-
for/family-business_pl). In our study we only discriminate for financial firms due to the 
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fact that this kind of firms are subjected to different disclosure requirements and thus 
calculation of earnings management may be problematic according to extend 
literature.  
The initial criterion for our selection using Amadeus database was the status of a 
company. We include only active companies. A total number of 20,124,001 companies 
were selected, a number which was further reduced to 8,412,030 companies by 
selecting all firms across Euro area. Our next criterion was to restrict only for listed 
companies. Implementing the above mentioned criterion lead us to a sample of 3,325 
enterprises. Once we included all the aforementioned crucial steps so as to maintain a 
base for active listed companies with headquarters across euro zone, we went on 
further to ask for the criterion of active accounts for the last 10 years to be assured for 
the final availability of needed data. Thus, our sample included 2,291 companies. 
After exporting the excel file from Amadeus database, we went on further to examine 
companies with unavailable important data. First of all, we used the “countblank” 
excel command to exclude firms that were missing data for any of the five year period 
in all of the figures and ratios needed. By doing so we excluded a large number of 
companies mainly due to the lack of available data for 2016, although our final export 
was taken during November 2017. Thus, 1,631 companies were excluded, so we 
remain with 653 companies translated into 3,265 observations. Further during our 
calculation on Stata, we dropped another 702 observations due to missing Accrual 
figures and finally we ended up having 2,563 observations of 641 corporations. 
In this point it should be mentioned that during the selection process, taking into 
account the difficulties concerning ownership information collection, we had to apply 
advanced techniques to assign each percentage of ownership to the right type of 
shareholder. Amadeus database provided us with ownership information (percentage 
and salutation of owner) of all 641 corporations although we had to figure out a way to 
assign and sum each percentage to an ownership type. In order to do so, we figured 
out a technique that is displayed in the table 2 and table 3 to assign each shareholder 
type (9015 code) provided by Amadeus database to the common ownership types 
mentioned in literature that is: Insider ownership, Family ownership, Institutional 
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Ownership, Government ownership, Private ownership and Public ownership. Then we 
used the “sumifs” excel command to sum and assign simultaneously each percentage 
to the right ownership type. Through this whole demanding and time consuming 
process, we excluded all companies with missing ownership information at all. 
Five year information was requested from the database for Net Income, Cash flow to 
operating revenue as percentage (Cash flow as a whole was not available on the 
platform), Total Assets, Operating Revenue, Current Assets, Other Current Assets, Cash 
& Cash Equivalents and Stock to calculate Receivables (because Receivables was not 
available on the Amadeus platform), Fixed assets, Sales, COGS, Other Operating 
Expenses, R & D and Depreciation & Amortization to estimate Net Sales (not available), 
Auditors full name so as to calculate the dummy variable of Big4, ROA ratio, Long Term 
Debt to calculate Leverage (long term debt to total assets). Most of the figures used for 
our demanding research, due to the fact that multiple functions were used needing a 
great amount of data, were calculated as much of data were not available on Amadeus 
platform. 
Table 2: Shareholder types Amadeus Database 
Shareholder - Type (AMADEUS) 
Name Code 
Corporate 3 
Publicauthority, state, government 6 
Bank 3 
Mutual and pension fund, nominee, trust, trustee 3 
Insurance company 3 
Public 6 
Financialcompany 3 
Selfownership 2 
One or more named individuals or families 2 
Privateequityfirm 3 
Employees, managers, directors 1 
Foundation, researchInstitute 3 
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Venture capital 3 
Other unnamed shareholders, aggregated 5 
Hedge fund 3 
Unnamed private shareholders, aggregated 5 
 
Table 3: Types of ownership according Literature 
Types of ownership (Literature) 
Type Code 
Ins 1 
Fam 2 
Inst 3 
Gov 4 
Private 5 
Public 6 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter will provide descriptive statistics on the dependent variables and the 
explanatory ones. Moreover, it will be informative about correlations among variables 
used. Then, we conclude with the regression analysis including our research’s finding. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
The descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables of our study are 
shown in table 4. All continuous variables are winsorized in the 1st and 99th percentile 
to mitigate any effects from outliers. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4 reports a mean value of 0.73 of our variable AB_DIS (absolute value of 
discretionary expenses), a mean value of 0.94 AB_COGS (abnormal cost of goods sold), 
a mean value of -0.02 AB_INV, a mean of 0.79 AB_PROD and a mean of 0.15 AB_CFO. 
According to the above findings and taking into account the standard deviation of all 
the aforementioned, we observe that AB_COGS has the highest mean value and the 
highest standard deviation value which means that it is a measure that is used 
extensively by managers of the selected firms. Based on managerial judgments and 
estimates, cost of goods sold seems to be the easiest portion to manipulate, because 
of the nature of these accounts. Furthermore, the mean value of AB_PROD which is 
the combined measure of abnormal COGS (AB_COGS) and the abnormal inventory 
(AB_INV) takes the second highest mean value and the second highest standard 
deviation meaning that both the inventory and the cost of goods sold manipulations 
Variable Min 25th Mean Median 75th Max StDev
AB_DIS -107.972 -0.019 0.727 0.235 0.852 75.256 10.905
AB_COGS -201.058 -0.082 0.941 0.302 1.306 167.618 23.011
AB_INV -4.106 -0.024 -0.022 0 0.026 2.519 0.434
AB_PROD -85.617 -0.076 0.792 0.185 1.044 89.478 12.748
AB_CFO -6.691 -0.015 0.151 0.036 0.163 7.461 1.066
JDA -2.836 -0.024 0.011 0 0.046 2.439 0.388
Ins 0 0 1.311 0 0.31 48.27 4.895
Fam 0 0.14 18.59 5 29.65 100 25.286
Instit 0 17.33 44.638 46.04 70.14 100 30.063
COMB_RAM -109.643 -0.583 -0.071 0 0.645 92.994 14.592
lnSIZE 7.302 10.913 12.496 13.221 13.614 17.702 2.078
Big4 0 0 0.616 1 1 1 0.486
LnAge 2.303 3.178 3.76 3.738 4.554 4.963 0.715
ROA -0.868 -0.056 -0.032 -0.004 0.035 0.204 0.134
Lev 0 0.041 0.162 0.125 0.234 0.814 0.157
EqOffer 0 0 0.294 0 1 1 0.456
Loss 0 0 0.284 0 1 1 0.451
Growth -0.646 -0.048 0.03 0.022 0.097 1.172 0.2
Note: All numbers are rounded up to third decimal place.
  42 
take place in the tested sample. Of all the above, the abnormal inventory (AB_INV) 
seems to be the less used by managers. 
Examining the median value of all the pronounced, which is better suited for skewed 
distributions to derive at central tendency since it is much more robust and sensible, 
we conclude that abnormal cost of goods sold are more frequently used (with a 
median value of 0.30) and abnormal inventory more rarely used by managers (with a 
median value of zero). 
Worth noticing, that mean value of JDA (value of discretionary accruals) is very close to 
zero (0.011). According to the related literature, Jones model residual is zero by 
construction (residual of a regression), whereas the mean modified Jones model 
residual is not constrained to be zero by construction (Cohen et al. 2008). 
The above mentioned findings are not mirrored to our COMB_RAM with the same 
notion. The result of mean COMB_RAM is -0.07 and the median is 0. It is observed that 
there is an increase from mean to median, the opposite from our other dependent 
variable (AB_DIS), but both mean and median are close to zero. One thing worth 
mentioned is that it is inaccurate to deduct that managers do not manipulate the 
reported earnings since, according to data, all firms manage earnings either upwardly 
or downwardly and as a consequence the mean tends to zero.  
The empirical analysis on Table 4 also provides information on ownership structure. 
The mean value of Ins is 1.3 which indicates that 1.3% of the companies of firms 
selected are expected to be under managerial ownership. Observations also reveal the 
mean value of Fam is 18.6 which indicates that a significant amount of companies 
examined in the Euro zone, the 18.6% to be exact are consider to be family firms. 
Worth noticing, a corporate governance significance. There is a difference between Ins 
and Fam, that indicates that managers on Euro zone companies are not also owners or 
members of families in control. Family controlled firms, based on the findings, 
preferred to appoint an external member of the family as a manager, than keeping 
management for themselves. 
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Furthermore, the mean of the Instit variable is 44.64. From all companies selected 
almost a 45% is owned by other institutions. That also explains the result of Big4 
control variable.  
Big4 mean is 0.62, meaning that 62% of firms selected are using one of the big 4 audit 
firms (Deloitte, Pricewaterhousecoopers, Ernst & Young and KPMG). The median value 
of Big4 is absolute 1, indicating that all firms selected close to the central tendency 
observations, are audited by one of big 4 audit firms.   Take into consideration also the 
percentage of 45% companies owned by institutions it seems that the vast majority of 
the companies selected choose a major audit firm.  
Moreover, natural logarithms of firms’ size (LnSize) and firms’ age (LnAge) is used as 
independent variables in order to keep the order of the values intact and hence results 
obtained with a transformed variable interpretable. The desired effects of this 
transformation could be a scaling of the regressions coefficients or improving their 
quality amongst others. It goes without saying that in case that the variable is highly 
skewed to the right, which may produce problems in the regressions analysis. We 
expect a positive relation between the size of the firms and the earnings manipulation, 
on the notion that bigger firms’ managers have more incentives to manipulate 
earnings. 
Going further with the ROA variable, we face a mean of -0.03. Having negative ROA is 
an indicator that the vast majority in our companies sample are investing high 
amounts of capital into production while receiving little income. If a negative ROA is 
accompanied by high levels of debt, the effect of ROA is bigger. This control variable is 
also an indicator that many of the companies selected are following a risky strategy. 
The mean of the variable Lev (ratio of long-term debt to assets) for our sample is 0.16 
(contradicting results taking into account the above mentioned ROA figure). Based on 
that low level degree of risk we assume that sample companies are able to repay debts 
and therefore the need for numbers manipulation in order for the lenders not to be 
sceptical should be decreasing. We expect that the higher the leverage the higher the 
possibility and the more the incentives to manipulate earnings. 
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Another control variable we took into consideration is the EqOffer (equity offering). 
The mean value of 0.29 illustrates the fact that almost 30% of the companies of our 
sample are offering new issued stocks.  If we examine that, in comparison with the fact 
that almost the same percentage of companies are appearing to have losses. We can 
assume that, inside our sample, companies facing losses are issuing new stocks in 
order to offset financial distress. Losses are expected to “promote” earnings 
management since firms facing financial difficulties have adequate incentives to 
manipulate reported accounts. 
Following we are going to examine the correlations among the variables of our 
investigation.  The Pearson Pair wise correlation coefficients for all of the major 
variables used in our investigation are shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. AB_DIS 1.00
2. AB_COGS 0.82*** 1.00
3. AB_INV -0.09*** -0.10*** 1.00
4. AB_PROD 0.38*** 0.56*** -0.09*** 1.00
5. AB_CFO 0.51*** 0.45*** -0.07*** 0.54*** 1.00
6. JDA -0.14*** -0.10*** 0.16*** -0.10*** -0.13*** 1.00
7. Ins -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 1.00
8. Fam 0.02 0.01 -0.03* -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.07*** 1.00
9. Instit 0.03 0.03* 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.11*** -0.66*** 1.00
10. COMB_RAM 0.40*** 0.08*** 0.06*** -0.60*** -0.06*** 0.01 0.00 0.03* 0.00
11. lnSIZE 0.04* 0.06*** -0.02 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.02 0.03 -0.22*** 0.03*
12. Big4 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.03* 0.03* -0.03* 0.03 -0.33*** 0.13***
13. lnAge 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.13*** 0.26*** -0.15***
14. ROA 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.03*
15. Lev 0.02 0.03 -0.04* 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.01
16. EqOffer -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.03* 0.08*** -0.19*** 0.01
17. Loss -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04* -0.02 -0.03* 0.16*** -0.11***
18. Growth -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02
Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1. AB_DIS
2. AB_COGS
3. AB_INV
4. AB_PROD
5. AB_CFO
6. JDA
7. Ins
8. Fam
9. Instit
10. COMB_RAM 1.00
11. lnSIZE -0.03 1.00
12. Big4 -0.03 0.32*** 1.00
13. lnAge 0.00 0.08*** -0.19*** 1.00
14. ROA 0.00 0.15*** 0.00 0.10*** 1.00
15. Lev 0.01 0.10*** -0.03 0.12*** -0.08*** 1.00
16. EqOffer -0.03* 0.14*** 0.20*** -0.23*** -0.12*** 0.05*** 1.00
17. Loss 0.00 -0.23*** -0.19*** 0.11*** -0.51*** 0.06*** 0.03* 1.00
18. Growth 0.02 -0.04* 0.04** -0.06*** 0.15*** 0.00 0.08*** -0.18*** 1.00
Note: Values with asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, 
respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded up to second decimal place.
Note: Values with asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, 
respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded up to second decimal place.
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The correlation coefficient between our main explanatory variables (Ins, Fam, Instit) is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Specifically the correlation coefficient between 
the variables Fam and Ins is equal to -0.07. Variables Instit and Ins are also negative 
correlated with a coefficient of -0.11. That means that they have the same kind of 
relation as Fam and Ins. An increase (decrease) of one variable by one (1) unit has an 
effect of 0.11 accordingly.  
Our main model’s dependent variable, JDA has a statistical significance at the level of 
1% with all the others dependent variables (AB_DIS; AB_COGS; AB_INV; AB_PROD and 
AB_CFO). The only positive correlation is noted only between JDA and AB_INV. The 
coefficient of 0.16 indicates a weak relationship between the two. Analysing that, it is 
expected that an increase (decrease) of 1 unit in one variable will affect the other by 
increasing (decreasing) 0.16 units. JDA correlation with the rest dependent variables it 
is noted to be a weak negative one. 
Furthermore, the correlations between our dependent variables and explanatory ones 
are quite prepossessing. More Specifically Ins, Fam and Instit are not statistically 
significant with JDA (value of discretionary accruals) at any level. Nevertheless a 
positive correlation coefficient is dimmed observed between JDA, and variable Instit. 
The Fam variable as noted has the opposite effect, while Ins is zero. 
On the other hand, COMB_RAM, the one that measures Real Activity Manipulation is 
only statistical significant with the Fam control variable. Focusing on that, COMB_RAM 
and Fam are correlated with a coefficient of 0.03. Analyzing the coefficient it is 
expected that an increase (decrease) of one variable by one (1) unit will cause an 
increase (decrease) by 0.03 units. This fact confirms our hypothesis No 2 (H2). 
Subsequently, examining correlations between our variable AB_DIS opposed to other 
independent variables we came to the following results. 
Statistical significance at the level of 1% is observed between the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (AB_DIS) and cost of goods sold variable (AB_COGS). The 
correlation coefficient between those two variables is very strong. A correlation 
coefficient of 0.82 means that AB_DIS and AB_COGS are positive related, so an 
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increase (decrease) in one (1) unit of one of these variables will cause an increase 
(decrease) to the other. The strong correlation coefficient between those two variables 
indicates also the kind of relation these two variables have, meaning that there is 
almost a certainty that if discretionary expenses are manipulated the same thing is 
happening for cost of goods sold. 
Following, the findings concerning the correlation coefficient among AB_DIS and 
AB_INV (absolute value of change in inventory) shows a negative weak relationship (-
0.09) statistically significant at 1%. The meaning of that is an increase (decrease) of one 
(1) unit to one of those variables will cause a decrease (increase) of 0.09 units to the 
other variable. The relation between the variable discretionary expenses and abnormal 
product cost variable (AB_PROD) is statistically significant at 1% level and there is a 
positive moderate correlation of 0.38. Changes in one of variables by (1) unit degree 
causes a moderate change of 0.38 unit in the other variable. 
The correlation coefficient between variables AB_DIS and AB_CFO is characterized by a 
positive almost strong statistically significant at 1% level relationship. Stating that a 
decrease of 1 unit in the absolute value of discretionary expenses will affect the 
abnormal cash flow to decrease by 0.51 units. This positive kind of correlation features 
even more the fact that manipulation findings in discretionary expenses will be 
followed by manipulation findings in the cash flow reports in a lower degree. 
As Table 5 reports, correlation coefficients between variable AB_DIS and the 
independent ones are no statistically significant. Only the natural logarithm of size 
(lnSIZE) has a weak positive correlation coefficient of 0.04 at 10% level of significance. 
Thereupon and by examining our dependent variable for real activity manipulation in 
comparison with our other dependent variables we found the following results. 
Our dissertation’s proxy variable (COMB_RAM) is weakly and positive correlated with 
AB_COGS (cost of goods sold) by a coefficient of 0.08, at a level of significance of 1%. 
Same amount of correlation applies also with the variable AB_INV (change in 
inventory) which is about 0.06. 
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The result of the correlation coefficient between COMB_RAM and variable AB_PROD 
(abnormal production costs) is -0.60. Analyses of the before mentioned number 
indicates that there is a strong relation between these two variables. Changes in one 
variable, drives the second variable to a change of 0.60 units (assuming that the first 
variable changes by one (1) unit). Changes of course are in the opposite direction, 
since the correlation coefficient is negative. That means that a positive change in the 
first variable (increase) will affect the second variable negatively (decrease). The above 
mentioned characteristics found at a level of significance at 1%. 
Abnormal cash flows are negative correlated with COMB_RAM at a level of significance 
of 1%. Correlation coefficient among these variables is -0.06. Although this is a week 
correlation between COMB_RAM and AB_CFO a change in one variable affects slightly 
and negatively the other. 
Correlation coefficient between our proxy variable (COMB_RAM) and other 
independent variables (lnSIZE; Big4; lnAge; ROA; Lev; Loss and Growth) are statistically 
insignificant and do not affect the results of our research. Only EqOffer variable seems 
to have a statistical significance at 10% level, but the correlation in very weak (-0.03). 
Presence of strong statistical significance at the level of 1% of the correlation 
coefficient among the variables; AB_COGS; AB_INV; AB_PROD and AB_CFO is very 
interesting. 
There is a weak negative correlation coefficient of -0.10 between cost of goods sold 
(AB_COGS) and change in inventory (AB_INV) at the level of 1% significance. That 
suggests that 1 unit change in one of those variables will affect by 0.10 units the other, 
the opposite way. Further than that, the examination of the above correlation 
coefficient indicates the quality of the relationship between those two variables. For 
example, when inventory is increasing, therefore the change in inventory (AB_INV) is 
increasing also. Cost of goods sold records a slight decrease, because goods are stored 
and do not taking part in the sales process.   
Based on the results, variables AB_COGS and AB_PROD appeared to have a positive 
strong correlation coefficient of 0.56, at the level of 1%. That indicates that an increase 
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(decrease) by one (1) unit to one variable will case an increase (decrease) to the other 
variable. This amount of correlation shows that when abnormal production costs are 
increasing, they have a same direction impact to cost of goods sold.  On the other hand 
and at the same level of significance, AB_PROD and AB_INV have a negative weak 
correlation coefficient. Specifically, -0.09 means that there a slight impact between 
those two variables, that shows only the notion of how one variable affects the other. 
Subsequently, correlation coefficient between AB_CFO (abnormal cash flow) and AB 
COGS present a moderate positive relationship of 0.45 at the level of 1% statistical 
significance. That implies that a possible change by one (1) unit in the AB_CFO affects 
enough the other by 0.45 units in the same direction. As the previous variables duel, 
when it comes to AB_INV (change in inventory), AB_CFO findings reveal almost the 
same negative weak correlation coefficient (-0.07) having the same kind of relationship 
as AB_PROD and AB_INV have. 
A positive strong correlation coefficient of 0.54 at 1% level of significance is noticed 
between AB_PROB and AB_CFO. Any changes in the AB_PROD have a positive and 
strong impact in AB_CFO and vice versa. To illustrate the correlation between those 
two variables, a decrease of 1 unit in the abnormal cash flows will cause a decrease to 
abnormal production costs by 0.54. 
The natural logarithm of size (lnSize) has statistical significance at the level of 1% with 
many of our independent variables. Examining the results size seems to affect slightly 
AB_COGS, AB_PROD and AB_CFO. The correlation coefficient among those variables is 
not very strong by it sets the direction and the way that size affects the above 
mentioned variables. 
Moreover, Big4 seems to be statistically significant at the level of 10%. Although the 
results are close to zero, and there is no stable link between of how the fact of being 
audited by a big 4 audit firm affects our explanatory variables. Generally, for the rest of 
our explanatory variables included in Table 5, correlation between them is statistically 
insignificant. Based on our findings correlations found also present to be very weak 
(close to zero). 
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In addition, the correlation between variables absolute value of discretionary expenses 
(AB_DIS) and our combined measure of real activity manipulation (COMB_RAM) is of 
great interest. Based on our findings correlation coefficient between those is 0.40, at 
the level of statistical significance of 1%. 
5.2 Regression Analysis 
Evidence presented by descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix concerning 
univariate relations between the variables is not enough. Therefore we employ 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis for even more depth results. 
Table 6: OLS Regression Output 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AB_CFO AB_COGS AB_DIS AB_INV AB_PROD JDA COMB_RAM
Ins -0.001 -0.08 -0.29 -0.02 -0.065 0.001 0.031
(-0.13) (-0.95) (-0.60) (-1.39) (-1.33) (-0.69) (0.52)
Fam 0.003** 0.071*** 0.037*** -0.000 0.045*** -0.001* 0.028*
(2.57) (2.98) (3.67) (-0.82) (4.00) (-1.69) (1.79)
Instit 0.001 0.069*** 0.032*** 0.000 0.034*** -0.000 0.21
(0.96) (3.61) (3.65) (0.35) (3.83) (-0.88) (1.63)
COMB_RAM -0.005 0.115 0.297*** 0.002 -0.528*** 0.000 -
(-0.93) (0.74) (4.35) (0.93) (-8.52) (0.16) -
lnSIZE 0.048*** 0.789*** 0.341** -0.006 0.347** 0.008* -0.024
(3.37) (2.58) (2.55) (-1.12) (2.41) (1.67) (-0.13)
Big4 0.006 0.850 0.068 -0.020 0.060 -0.051** -0.044
(0.11) (0.67) (0.12) (-0.84) (0.11) (-2.48) (-0.61)
lnAge 0.009 0.541 -0.004 0.006 -0.051 -0.001 -0.007
(0.30) (0.84) (-0.01) (0.46) (-0.18) (-0.08) (-0.84)
ROA 0.091 -0.024 -0.032 -0.123* -0.229 0.078 0.352
(0.50) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-1.81) (-0.14) (0.67) (0.14)
Lev -0.000 5.325* 1.850 -0.148*** 1.025 0.048 2.051
(-0.00) (1.72) (1.57) (-2.68) (0.79) (0.68) (1.05)
EqOffer -0.024 -1.321 -0.287 0.008 0.387 -0.036* -0.930
(-0.46) (-1.26) (-0.57) (0.36) (0.77) (-1.93) (-1.24)
Loss -0.033 -0.689 -0.292 -0.031 -0.559 -0.007 -0.212
(-0.53) (-0.51) (-0.50) (-1.07) (-0.92) (-0.29) (0.26)
Growth -0.075 -1.808 -0.771 -0.012 -0.820 -0.022 1.377
(-0.82) (-1.00) (-1.03) (-0.24) (-1.06) (-0.58) 1.09
(intercept) -0.872*** -18.385*** -7.454*** 0.100 -7.548*** -0.057 -0.714
(-3.72) (-3.43) (-3.17) (1.18) (-3.10) (-0.74) (-0.26)
Industry Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
R
2 0.045 0.031 0.186 0.030 0.375 0.018 0,012
Adj R
2 0.020 0.005 0.164 0.004 0.358 -0.008 -0,005
Observations 2,563 2,563 2,563 2,563 2,563 2,563 2.563
Variables
Note : Standard errors are clustered at firm level with t-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded up to third decimal place.
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The outcome of our regression analysis helps to close the gap on the association 
between earnings management and ownership structure that descriptive statistics and 
correlations left. Most of the coefficients are statistically significant at a 1% level, 
especially when it comes to variables of interest.  As it is observed, there is an 
exception of a few insignificant variables, but it is noted that those variables are close 
to zero even at a level of 10% significance. 
Analyzing our dissertation’s main dependent variable, JDA’s statistical significance is 
not at a level that could lead us to safe results. The coefficients are closed to zero. That 
indicates that there is no enough evidence in our sample to justify or to reject our 
hypotheses.  
Based on the findings, our dependent variable AB_DIS is positive and statistical 
significant at 1% level with variable Fam at 0.037 while the t-statistic is 3.67. The link 
between those variables fits our hypothesis No 2 (H2) that family ownership is 
associated with higher earnings management. That means that the concentration of 
ownership to family members increases earnings management at a significant level. 
At the level of 1% significance, Institutional ownership is correlated with our AB_DIS as 
of 0.032. Coefficient of this amount is close to zero, hence institutional ownership is 
not affecting earnings management at the scale that justifies positive connection of 
AB_DIS and Instit. Therefore our hypothesis No 3 (H3), which supports that institutional 
ownership is associated with lower earnings management, is fully justified. 
Goes without saying that coefficient -0.29, between AB_DIS and Ins while the t-statistic 
is -0.60, is not statistically significant even at the level of 10%. Based on that and taking 
into consideration that according to the related literature we expected a negative 
relation between managerial ownership and earnings management, we cannot come 
to a safe conclusion for our Hypothesis No 1 (H1). The association between inside 
ownership and reported manipulation techniques may need extra analysis. 
Subsequently, findings on the rest of the variables are very intriguing. Specifically, the 
coefficient of the natural logarithm of size (lnSize) and AB_DIS is 0.341 at the 
significance level of 5%. That fact combined with the previously mentioned results 
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about our variables of interest could lead us to the idea that size impacts earnings 
management at a moderate level. The bigger the firm’s size the more the material 
misstatements. 
Two (2) of our hypotheses seem to govern Table 6. Indications of the table on that idea 
prove it. Coefficient of lnSize (natural logarithm of firm’s size) seems to impact all the 
other explanatory variables the same way. More specific, coefficient of lnSize and 
AB_CFO is 0.048 at level of significance 1%.  
Very important is the coefficient of lnSize and AB_COGS (abnormal cost of goods sold). 
At the significance level of 1% and coefficient of 0.789 indicates that lnSize influences 
AB_COGS at a large scale. It is very interesting to notice that lnSize affects most of our 
explanatory variables in the same way. Positive and at a level of significance of 1% - 
5%. 
Findings on Table 6 ratify findings on Table 5 concerning our control variable. 
Coefficient between COMP_RAM and AB_DIS at 0.297 at the statistical significance of 
1% on our regression analysis is 0.30, while at the same level of significance the 
coefficient with the AB_PROD is 0.528 proves the ratification. 
Furthermore, low R² it is not an indication that our model does not fit well the 
observations. It may also consist that our independent variables are influenced more 
from variables different from our explanatory ones. But based on our results, variables 
with higher R² indicate that the model used for them is more accurate. 
Summarizing the above-mentioned findings, two of this dissertation’s hypotheses are 
confirmed by the findings and vice versa. One hypothesis needs more extensive 
research. All of our hypotheses are fitted in our descriptive statistics, correlation 
matrix and regression analysis findings. 
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6. CONCLUTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Berle and Means (1932) are among the first who examined the association between a 
firm’s ownership structure and its performance where their argument was that, since 
interests of management and shareholders are not necessarily aligned, corporate 
resources are not used efficiently for value maximizing. In fact, they suggested a 
negative relationship between control and performance. 
This dissertation examines the association between ownership structure and earnings 
management for companies in the Euro zone. All data collected by us using Amadeus 
database provided by the International Hellenic University. Years under scrutiny were 
2012 through 2016.  Using a final sample that it was consisted by 641 we met results in 
the same direction of other researchers’ investigations.  
Regarding the relationship between earnings management and ownership structures 
consisted by insiders (managers), we found that all proven literature included in our 
hypothesis No 1 development it is true. No finding was against our hypothesis No 1 
(H1) and the literature.  
The hypothesis of earnings management and family ownership are highly linked with 
each other (Hypothesis No 2) it is proven over the findings of discretionary accruals, 
research’s correlation matrix and as it is expected in our regression analysis. 
At the same direction, Hypothesis No 3 (H3) it is proven also. Findings in our research 
confirm that institutional ownership affects in a lower scale earnings management 
because of the better monitoring mechanisms, as many researchers report in the past 
(Almazan et al., 2005; Chung et al., 2002). 
This thesis met some limitations which should be taken into consideration. First of all, 
Euro zone is consisted by very different countries. Companies operating all over Euro 
zone are not operating in the same environment. Northern Europe provides better 
economic environment for firms to operate. The economies are well structured, states 
are more organized and global phenomena have less negative impact. In contrast, 
Southern Europe is a completely different environment for firms to operate. Not 
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having the same kind of organization, and in general the same appropriate conditions, 
southern Europe’s companies do not operate at the same level as the northern ones. 
Secondly, it should be mentioned that most of the figures used for our demanding 
research, due to the fact that multiple functions were used needing a great amount of 
data, were calculated as much of data were not available on Amadeus platform. This 
fact entails a risk. So future researchers that might want to examine ownership 
structures and its relation with earnings management could use different models, 
different variables and might need to alter their selection process. 
Moreover, during our research we faced several difficulties due to the unavailability of 
ownership information for Euro area companies. That was the case since our initial 
sample consisted of 2,291 companies operating in 11 of 19 Euro area countries and our 
testing sample after dropping firms with unavailable data included 641 listed 
companies. In this direction, future research might use different sampling methods to 
examine the pronounced relation. 
Another limitation which it should be taken under consideration is the fact that Europe 
is still emerging of the 2008 global finance crisis that started in the United States of 
America with multiple domino effects. Companies are not able to perform at full 
capacity, so maybe the findings are mirroring also the correlation between ownership 
structures and earnings management but under distressed environment.  
Euro zone is not yet equalized, for the results of the dissertation to be more consistent. 
Subsequently further research is needed which will be based on the results of this 
study in order to establish more comprehensive understanding and contribute more to 
the payout literature. 
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